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MERGERS AND ALLIANCES 
IN THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY: 
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE




This article chronicles the history of mergers and alliances in the liner shipping industry during the past 
century before focusing on the latest wave of mergers to hit the industry Each merger wave in the liner 
shipping industry generally coincided with merger waves from the general industrial world. The 
incentive for each wave of mergers seemed to be different, with the most recent wave focusing on synergy 
between the merging companies. The reduction of competing firms through mergers has implications for 
the shipper and these are also examined.
INTRODUCTION
In the present decade, mergers and strategic 
alliances have become the model for liner 
shipping companies in coping with the 
globalization of the world economy. The present 
day competition and rise in the cost of capital has 
resulted in a steady fall in profits. Liner shipping 
companies "are characterized by operating 
scheduled services between predetermined 
ranges of ports on a continuous basis." (U.N.) 
Most liner shipping service today is focused on 
containerized freight traffic. Competition in the 
liner shipping industry has been in existence 
since the days when sailing ships were 
introduced. The intense competition at the turn of
the last century can be compared to the present 
day competition in the liner shipping industry. 
The commonality between the two periods 
represents an attempt to increase price stability 
and profitability. This paper will chronicle the 
merger history of the liner shipping industry and 
conclude with the current rationale for the most 
recent wave of merger activity and how it might 
affect the shipper.
HISTORY OF THE MERGERS 
AND THE MERGER WAVE CYCLE
Four periods of high merger activity, called 
merger waves, can be identified in the history of 
US and UK industrial development. During these
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periods, consolidation of various industries took 
place. The liner shipping industry was one such 
industry affected by these merger waves. In the 
US, these industrial merger waves occurred 
between 1897-1904; 1916-1929; 1965-1969, 1984- 
1989, and most recently in the early 1990’s 
continuing to the present. The reason for the 
occurrence of these merger waves was different 
for each period. The first wave resulted in 
monopolistic merger, the second wave for 
oligopoly, the third wave for conglomerate 
merger, the fourth wave was the period of hostile 
and mega-mergers and the present day merger's 
objective is strategic gains (Gaughan 1996). The 
merger activity in liner shipping has coincided 
with the merger activity in other industries. 
Mergers, acquisitions and alliances in the liner 
shipping industry have always occurred in a 
periodical wave manner. From the data collected 
(see Appendix), the merger waves in the liner 
shipping industry can be categorized into four 
periods, 1875-1898; 1914-1926; 1964-1973; and 
1981-1989, which with little exception correspond 
to the general industrial merger waves. The 
present day merger activity can be traced from 
1995-present day. These periods of merger waves 
saw increased activity of mergers, acquisition 
and alliances.
The First Merger Wave: 1875-1898
In the late 19th century, steamships used to 
regularly ply between Europe and India/Far East, 
but the competition was not very severe. The 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which reduced 
the voyage duration, increased the effective 
earning capacity of each vessel and created 
cutthroat competition among the shipowners, 
finally resulting in the formation of shipping 
conferences. It was one of the first types of 
mutual pact among shipowners to protect their 
interests. In the following years, many 
conferences were formed to safeguard shipowner 
interests (Deakin and Seward 1973). The period 
before 1900 saw heightened activity in the 
formation of shipping conferences and the period
between 1890-1898 saw increased merger 
activity.
This merger wave occurred after the depression 
of 1883 and peaked between 1898 and 1902. 
General industry mergers during this period were 
horizontal and often resulted in a monopolistic 
market structure (Gaughan 1991). Similar 
monopolistic market structures were also 
witnessed in the liner shipping industry, where 
the conference system created a price cartel. An 
example to this effect was rate fixing set by the 
shipowners of the Calcutta conference for the 
carriage of tea (Deakin and Seward 1973). It was 
financial factors which forced the end of the first 
merger wave, including the collapse of the 
shipbuilding trust in 1900 and the crash of the 
stock market in 1904 in the US (Gaughan 1991).
The Second Merger Wave: 1914-1926
The second wave of mergers in the liner shipping 
industry occurred during the First World War and 
continued until 1926. While the first wave was 
merger for monopoly, the second wave was 
merger for oligopoly. The booming economy after 
the first World War provided the investment 
capital for these mergers (Gaughan 1996). During 
this period, the largest merger was that between 
British India Steam Navigation Company and the 
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company, followed by the Ellerman Lines & Hall 
Lines merger to form Ellerman Line (Deakin and 
Sewrard 1973). The second merger wave ended 
with the stock market crash of 1929.
The Third Merger Wave: 1964-1973
The third merger cycle occurred between 1964 
and 1973. The introduction of container services 
to the liner trades in the mid 60’s brought in a 
revolution, not only in handling methods, but also 
in the whole structure and operation of general 
cargo transportation. The desire to build 
container ships and the related specialized 
handling facilities in ports required heavy, capital
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intensive investments. Mergers during this wave 
transpired due to the heavy investment 
requirements of containerization, which made it 
virtually impossible for a single liner shipping 
company to undertake alone (Fossey 1996). 
Again, the mergers in the liner shipping industry 
coincided with the merger wave of other 
industries. Mergers in the third wave were 
conglomerate in nature (Gaughan 1991). Several 
mergers and consortia were formed during this 
period such as Overseas Containers Ltd (OCL), a 
closely knit pooling and joint marketing firm 
comprising British & Commonwealth, Furness 
Withy, Ocean Transport & Trading and P&O. The 
purpose was to formulate and develop strategy 
for converting UK-Far East liner services to 
containers. A year later this was followed by 
other UK-based operators; Ben Line Steamers, 
Blue Star Line, Cunard Steamship Co, Ellerman 
Lines and T&J Harrison formed Associated 
Container Transportation (ACT). The third 
merger wave subsided when the stock market fell 
in 1969 (Gaughan 1991).
The Fourth Merger Wave: 1981-1989
The fourth merger wave occurred between 1981 
and 1989 and was again different from previous 
merger waves as general industry concentrated 
more on hostile take-overs. During this period 
few mergers took place in the liner shipping 
industry. However, the airline industry 
experienced numerous acquisitions and 
consolidations due to deregulation (Gaughan 
1996).
The Current Merger Wave: 1995-Present
The present day mergers have differentiated 
themselves from all previous merger waves and 
have been classed as merging for strategic gain. 
This is very much true with liner shipping where 
mega-mergers and alliances have been formed 
due to increased competition and reduced profits. 
Deregulation in the airline industry resulted in 
mega-mergers; similar effects can be felt in the
liner shipping industry in which global 
deregulation has resulted in mega-mergers and 
alliances. The present day liner shipping industry 
is faced with alliances such as Global, Grand. 
Sealand-Maersk and mega-mergers such as P&O- 
Nedlloyd (See Tables 1 and 6).
Thus, it is clear that the liner shipping industry’ 
has experience merger wave cycles, which 
coincided with the merger wave cycle 
experienced by other industries. These merger 
cycles were experienced during the bullish phase 
of stock markets and during periods of a liberal 
banking system fuelled by deregulation, which 
are the main ingredients of mergers and 
acquisitions. Therefore, it is apparent that liner 
shipping is very much affected by the ups and 
downs of the overall market. The ups and downs 
of other industries do have an impact on liner 
shipping and the statement that shipping is a 
derived demand is very much true.
OBJECTIVES OF MERGERS 
AND ALLIANCES
As with all business activity, there must be 
justification for engaging in either a merger or an 
alliance. We look at the theoretical basis for 
acquiring strategic gain in terms of synergy and 
then examine whether or not they apply in the 
"real world" based on actual merger activities.
Synergy
Synergy basically refers to the coming together of 
firms to produce a corporate combination which 
is more profitable than the sum of the individual 
firms profit combined (Gaughan 1991). There are 
two types of synergy that firms try and exploit 
when participating in mergers and alliances; 
Operating Synergy and Financial Synergy. Both 
are explained briefly in the following paragraphs.
Operating Synergy
Operating synergy refers to the efficiency gains
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or operating economies that are derived in 
horizontal or vertical integration. Cost reduction 
is one of the main sources of operating synergy as 
a result of economies of scale, due to the 
reduction in the per unit cost that results from an 
increase in the size or scale of a company's 
operations.
In the context of the liner shipping industry, the 
present day merger/acquisition/alliances have 
increasingly concentrated on operating 
synergies, especially economies of scale 
(Drewery).
One of the main advantages of mergers/ alliances 
is the ability to cut costs by the rationalization of 
resources available to both the merging firms. 
Since competition is very severe in the liner 
shipping industry and the freight rates in certain 
trade lanes have fallen by 25% in the last three 
years (Bray 1997), the operating profit of the 
companies cannot be enhanced by increasing the 
freight rate. Therefore, the only alternative left is 
to reduce the cost of operation by merging the 
companies together. Alliances aim to cut costs by 
means of slot chartering/vessel sharing 
agreements, joint terminal contracts, common 
use of equipment and even by the joint purchase 
of ships and equipment. P&O-Nedlloyd is aiming 
to achieve $100/TEU savings from their merger. 
Table 1 highlights the estimated annual savings 
projected by the recent alliances.
Financial Synergy
Financial synergy refers to the impact of a 
corporate merger/acquisition on the costs of 
capital to the acquiring firm or the merging 
partners. The cost of capital is lowered when the 
corporate combination occurs which evinces the 
presence of financial synergy (Gaughan 1991).
The combination of two companies reduces the 
risk of bankruptcy, provided the cash flows are 
not correlated. If the acquisition/merger lowers 
the volatility of the cash flows then the supplier of
the capital may consider the firm less risky. The 
risk of bankruptcy would be less, given the fact 
that wide swings up and down in the combined 
firm's cash flow would be less likely. As a result, 
the banks feel confident enough to lend money to 
such firms due to the lessening of the risk 
element. The merger of P&O-Nedlloyd resulted in 
P&O-Nedlloyd securing a credit line of $1 billion, 
which will be used for financing the newly merged 
line and new ships on order (Containerization 
International Jan. 1997).
TABLE 1







Sealand - Maersk Alliance $ 100/Year
P&O-Nedlloyd Merger $ 200 / Year
NOL-APL Merger $ 130 / Year
DSR-Senator Merger $ 65.67 / Year
A larger company enjoys more advantages in the 
financial market as compared to a relatively 
small company. The advantage gained is in the 
form of lower costs of raising capital as it is 
generally less risky than with a smaller firm. The 
effect of P&O's merger reduced the group 
borrowing by $354.3 million (P&O Annual Report 
1996).
Stock Market Response to Synergy
The popular objective of any company is to 
increase earnings per share (EPS) and many 
mergers have been justified in terms of the effect 
on EPS. Earnings per share is based on 
accounting profit which is subject to accounting 
policies on stock valuation, asset depreciation, 
bad debts, profit on long term contracts, 
provisions for accrued income and expenditure. 
The price-earnings ratio (P/E) is equal to the 
share price divided by the earnings per share.
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Neptune Orient Line (NOL) in April made a 
friendly acquisition bid on APL for $33.5 per 
share, which amounted to a total of $825 million
(Bray 1997). The individual figures of both 
companies and their combined figures are 
displayed in Table 2 .
TABLE 2
EFFECT OF MERGER ON FINANCIAL STATUS FOR NOL AND APL
NOL APL NOL + APL
EPS (US $) $ 0.0202 $0.0211 $ 0.2008
Price/Share (US $) $ 0.8198 $ 20.36 $ 1.5132
P/E Ratio 40.5 964.9 7.53
No. of shares 722,300,000 24,600,000 722,300,000
Total Earnings $ 14,590,460 $ 519,060 $ 145,109,520
Total Market Value $ 592,141,540 $ 500,856,000 $ 1,092,997,540
The earnings per share (EPS) and number of 
shares are obtained from the individual 
companies' profit and loss accounts for 1996. The 
price per share (PPS) is the average of the share 
prices 20 days before the take-over. The EPS of 
the combined firm is $0.2008 , which is greater 
than the EPS of the individual companies. If the 
merger decision is made on the basis of EPS, then 
this is an extremely profitable merger.
Another key index as to the state of a company is 
its share price. A company which has not been 
performing profitably for a long time must use 
new strategies to give sufficient returns to its 
shareholders. One of the strategies is the 
merger/acquisition with/of a similar type of 
company. Share prices of both merging/acquiring 
companies are affected upon disclosure of the 
merger/acquisition activity. The effect on the 
share price depends on the expected costs and 
benefits of the deal and market expectations that 
the deal will actually be consummated. Studies 
have shown that shareholders of acquired 
companies are the big winners, receiving on 
average a 20% premium in a friendly merger and 
a 35% premium in a hostile take-over, whereas
shareholders of acquiring companies receive 
small returns that are not statistically different 
from zero for friendly mergers (Copeland, Koller 
& Murrin 1991).
Observe the case of Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) 
$825 million acquisition bid for American 
President Line (APL), under which NOL will 
acquire all 24.6 million outstanding shares at 
$33.5 per share. The day NOL made the disclosure 
of its intention of making a friendly acquisition of 
APL, the share prices of APL rose sharply from 
$21.5 to $29.75—a rise of $8.25 (Figure 1). The 
share prices of NOL rose gradually in Singapore 
dollars, from S$1.20 to S$1.26, which was an 
increment of S$0.06 (Figure 2).
In the case of NOL's acquisition of APL, the 
premium received by the target shareholders 
(APL) is considerably higher than the increase in 
the share price of the acquiring firm (NOL). The 
acquisition announcement has resulted in a rise 
in both the companies share prices— NOL’s 
share price rose by 7.2% and APL's share price 
rose by 45.2% and is summarized in Table 3.
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FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
Share prices of APL, Mar Apr 97
Days before& after merger announcement
Share price of NOL, Mar-Apr 97
Days before& after merger announcement
In another recent merger. Figures 3 and 4 show 
the market reaction to the initial disclosure of the 
merger of the liner shipping divisions of P&O and 
Nedlloyd. The day the announcement of merger 
was made known, the share price of P&O 
increased from 517 pence (06th Sep 96) to 560.5 
pence (09th Sep 96- 7th and 8th Sep being 
Saturday and Sunday), which was a jump of 43.5 
pence. The same reaction was demonstrated in 
Nedlloyd's share price which increased from 39.5 
FI (06th Sep 96) to 45.5 FI (09th Sep 96), an 
increment of 6F1.
Movements of share prices before the 
announcement were different in both cases but, 
after the merger disclosure, synchronous 
movements in the share prices can be observed 
before the actual merger has taken place. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the market 
reaction to any event affecting either company 
affects its merging partner, even though they 
have not legally merged. However, the behavior 
of share price acts as if they have merged.
It is observed that the percentage increase in the 
share prices is identical for both the companies, 
approximately 15% (See Table 4). The identical 
increment in the share prices can be attributed to 
the fact that the shareholders anticipate equal 
gains to both the companies through the 
synergies achieved through the merger.
The rise in the share price on the announcement
of merger/acquisition reflects the market's 
expectation of the effect of the merger on 
shareholders of the acquiring and acquired 
companies. It reflects the markets expectation of 
the costs and benefits of the proposed merger and 
the probability that the merger will go through. A 
positive reaction from the merger announcement 
reflects the shareholders anticipation that the 
merger will result in positive gains. A falling 
share price following the announcement reflects 
shareholders sentiment that the merger will not 
be beneficial and they should not approve the 
deal (Copeland, Koller & Murrin 1991). In the 
case of the above mentioned mergers, the 
reaction of the shareholders was positive. 
Shareholders approve of the proposed merger 
and anticipate wealth maximization in the near 
future through the resulting synergies.
Based on data in Table 5, we observe that many 
companies' operating profits from the liner 
shipping sector have fallen. While some 
companies have reported rises, their net 
operating profit has been used. These companies 
are diversified into other marine and non-marine 
sectors and, for many of them, the rise in the 
profitability is attributed to these sectors. For 
many companies, the return on investment has 
steadily fallen from double digit figures in the late 




PRE AND POST-ANNOUNCEMENT SHARE PRICE ACTIVITY
Company's
Mean of Share price
20 days before
Mean of Share price
20 days after % rise in the
Name announcement announcement share price
NOL SS1.16 S$1.25 7.8 %
APL US$20.36 US$29.58 45.2 %
Source: Datastream International, NOL company code-997373, APL company code-944881
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
Share price of P&O Aug Sep 96
P) (O N (\J 7 T
Mo of days before & after announcement
Share price of NedMoyd Aug- Sep 9S
No of days before & after announcement
TABLE 4
PRE AND POST-ANNOUNCEMENT SHARE PRICE ACTIVITY
Company's
Name
Mean of Share price
20 days before 
announcement
Mean of Share price
20 days after 
announcement
% rise in the 
share price
P&O 517.8 Pence 593.5 Pence 14.6%
Nedlloyd 38.51 Florins 44.28 Florins 14.9%
Source: Datastream International, P&O company code-901127, Nedlloyd company code-912796.
As a result of the falling operating profits, liner 
companies have entered into alliance 
agreements, merging and acquiring each other 
so that the costs can be reduced.
The oligopolistic character achieved by these 
firms can be studied by understanding the 
concentration ratio of these firms with respect to 
the tonnage held by them. Table 6 shows that the 
top 6 alliance groups will control 42.7% of the
World's TEU in service. This percentage is 
expected to increase at a steady rate due to the 
cost savings accrued through the alliances and 
mergers. These cost savings amassed through 
alliances and mergers will be used to offset the 
possible price reductions in the freight rates 
charged. This trend should result in other 
smaller firms merging or quitting the trade. 
Firms preferring to remain independent and not 
responding to these changes will end up bankrupt
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I' ABLE 5
PROFIT/LOSS OF MAJOR LINER SHIPPING COMPANIES
Company name Profit type used 1995 1996 Fall/Rise
P&O Liner Operating Profit 40.1m £ 30.3m £ Fall (24%)
Nedlloyd Liner Operating Profit 57m Dfl 25m Dfl Fall (56%)
Hapag-Lloyd Liner Operating Profit 265m Dm 230m Dm Fall (13%)
K-Line Liner Revenue 1.61b US$ 1.53b USS Fall (5%)
MOL Net Operating Profit -4.64m US$ 20.9m USS Rise(351%)
Maersk Tankers and liners Net
Operating Profit 1.16b Dkk 1.21b Dkk Rise (5%)
Yang Ming Net Operating Profit 2.82b NT$ 3.67b NTS Rise (30%)
Sea-Land Net Operating Profit 254m USS 318m USS Rise (80%)
APL Net Operating Profit 68.4m USS 141m USS Rise (106%)
ZIM Net Operating Profit 54m US $ 14m USS Fall (74%)
NYK Net Operating Profit 148.8m USS 208.4m USS Rise (40%)
Hanjin Net Operating Profit 134.3m USS 161.8m USS Rise (20%)
NOL Liner Revenue 1.0b USS 1.05b USS Rise (5%)
OOCL Operating Profit after
Financing 71.8m USS 60.2m USS Fall (16%)
Source: Individual Company Annual Reports or company websites.
or absorbed by larger companies except for 
companies operating in the niche market sector. 
The final market structure emerging in the next 
decade will be oligopolistic, given the current 
regulatory situation.
Growth and Expansion of Merging Firms' 
Sales and Market Share
World container trade has been increasing at a 
steady pace. This has been attributed to the 
growth in world trade which is steadily rising at 
a rate of 8% by volume per year and wrorld ship 
slots have been expanding at 22% per year, 
according to figures in Containerization 
International's 1997 Yearbook. The growth in 
world trade results in increased market share for
the liner companies. In this expanding market, 
shippers are looking closely at a carrier's ability 
to provide a wide range of high quality services at 
reasonable prices. Larger carriers are in a better 
position to offer the variety and quality of service 
desired and, therefore, should experience 
significant gains in market share (Lloyd's List 
1996A).
Today, shippers have focused on reducing the 
number of carriers they associate with and look 
to one-stop shopping for all their global shipping 
needs. Liner shipping firms can only offer this 
broad range of services through mergers or by 
joining alliances with other companies and thus 
sharing the resources and know-how.
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TABLE 6
MARKET CONCENTRATION OF TOP 6 LINER SHIPPING ALLIANCES
No Alliance Company Total TEU % Market Share
1. Sealand-Maersk Sea-land Service 203,244 4.3%
Alliance Maersk 200,919 4.3%
Total 404,163 8.6%











4. Kawa Yang Co K Line 83,634 1.8%
Yang Ming 81,229 1.7%
Cosco 183,726 3.9%
Total 348,589 7.4%





6. Evergreen 205,224 4.3%
Total alliance TEU 2,012,819 42.7%
Total World TEU 4,700,000 100%
Source: Containerization International Yearbook 1997
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The statistics of the container industry show 
that, by the end of 1996, the number of 
containers passed the 10 million mark. If present 
day growth remains steady, then by 2005, the 
number of containers will reach 20 million. It is 
believed that these alliances will control 85-90% 
of the world's container ships (Lloyd's List 
1996B).
The liner shipping industry previously has been 
involved in consortia membership but the 
membership was limited to cargo or revenue 
sharing arrangements. Falling freight rates and 
increasing costs are the reason that these liner 
companies are switching from pure trade lane 
arrangements to global alliance agreements 
(Lloyd's List 1996A ).
Joining forces with other carriers on a global 
basis offers an easy entry into markets 
previously considered impenetrable. American 
President Line (APL) had for a long time yearned 
to join the Europe-Far East trade and its 
membership with Global Alliance has made its 
entry into this trade possible without having to 
spend heavily. In turn, APL has offered the other 
alliance members its know-how and operational 
assets in the US and transpacific. Similarly with 
the Grand Alliance, NYK & NOL were able to slot 
charter Hapag-Lloyd tonnage across the Atlantic 
while Hapag-Lloyd wras able to take advantage of 
its partners' strength on the transpacific.
Mutual Benefits," Containerisation Inter­
national. November 96, p51.
"Eight plus six makes one," Containerisation 
International. October 96, p 43.
"..... as P&O Nedlloyd obtain USS 1 bn credit,"
Containerisation International. January 
1997, p 19.
Containerisation International Year Book, 
1997
CONCLUSION
The liner shipping industry in the past two years 
has been in the limelight with respect to the 
number of mergers and alliances which have 
shaken up the industry. The whole industry is 
presently undergoing restructuring. However, 
the merger waves experienced in the liner 
shipping industry have coincided with general 
industry merger waves, which implies that the 
liner shipping industry is very much dependent 
on other industries and the ups and downs in the 
global market very much affect its performance. 
The current state of the world economy may even 
take its toll on the liner shipping industry by 
causing several bankruptcies before conditions 
improve.
The implication for shippers, as a result of this 
consolidation, is less choice and higher freight 
rates in the long term. Less choice for the 
shipper may result in a decreased ability to serve 
their customers. Although there is currently far 
more capacity available than shippers' demand, a 
rationalized liner shipping industry will attempt 
to slow, or even stop, the growth in capacity, 
creating the climate for increases in freight rates. 
Today's benefits of lower freight rates may lead to 
tomorrow's rate increase, as the industry 
consolidates into a tighter and tighter group 
controlling a greater percentage of the market 
share.
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APPENDIX
HISTORICAL MERGER EVENTS OF MAJOR LINER COMPANIES:
Predecessor Year Event
Hapag-Lloyd 1875 Hapag bought Adler Line.
- 1875 ITK-Calcutta conference formed.
NYK 1885 N\rK was found through a merger between shipping assets of 
Mitsubishi and Kyodo Unyu Kaisha.
Hapag-Lloyd 1890 Hapag bought Carr Union Line.
- 1892 Conference of North European Lines formed (North Atlantic
Conference) comprising of Hapag, NDL, Holland America and Red Star.
Hapag-Lloyd 1898 Hapag bought King Sin Line.
Nedlloyd 1908 KPM, Rotterdam Lloyd and Nederland Line merged to form Koninklijke 
Hollandsche Lloyds (KHL).
P&O 1910 P&O bought Blue Anchor Line.
P&O 1914 Merger of P&O and British India Steamship Navigation.
Ellerman 1914 Ellerman lines and Hall Lines merged to form Ellerman Line.
P&O 1916 P&O acquired New Zealand Shipping Co and Federal Steam
Navigation Company.
P&O 1917 P&O acquired interest in the Union Steamship Company of
New Zealand. Hain Steamship Company and James Nourse Ltd.
P&O 1918 P&O bought Orient Line.
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Hapag-Lloyd 1918 Hapag acquired Hamburg Line.
Hapag-Lloyd 1918 NDL acquired Bremen Line.
P&C) 1919 P&O bought Khedivial Mail Line.
K-Line 1919 Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Line (K-Line) established.
P&O 1920 P&O bought General Steamship Navigation Company.
C.G.M 1920 Compagnie des Massageries Maritime acquired by Chargeurs Reunis.
A.P.L 1921 Pacific Mail Steamship Company acquired by Dollar Steamship Line.
P&O 1923 P&O bought Strick Line.
Hapag-Lloyd 1926 Hapag acquired Deutsh-Australische Dampfschiffs Gesellscaft (DADG)
C.G.M 1931 French government acquired a majority stake in the
Generale transatlantique.
A.P.L 1952 Dollar Steamship Lines acquired by Ralph K Davies.
P&O 1960 P&O bought remainder of Orient Line.
K-Line 1964 K lines merger with the Liner department of lino Line.
N.Y.K 1964 NYK merged with Mitsubishi Kaium K.K
M.O.L 1964 Merger of Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK) and Mitsui Steamship
Company Ltd.
P&O 1965 Overseas Container Line formed comprising of P&O, Alfred Holt, 
British & Commonwealth and Furness Withy.
A.P.L 1965 APL merged with Natomas Company.
A.C.T 1966 Associated Container Transportation formed comprising of Ben Line
Steamers, Blue Star Line, Cunard Steamship Co, Ellerman Lines
and T&J Harrison.
- 1967 Transatlantic Shipping, Wallenius Lines, Cunard, Ellerman, Incotrans
form Atlantic Container Line (ACL).
C.G.M 1969 Transat merged its services with Navigation Mixte.
Hapag-Lloyd 1970 Hapag-Lloyd formed by the merger of Americanische Packetfahrt- 
Actien-Gesellscaft (Hapag) and Nordeutscher Lloyd (NDL).
Nedlloyd 1970 Merger of Royal Interocean Lines, Rotterdam Lloyd, Nederland Line, 
VNS to form Nedlloyd Group.
CGM 1973 French state owned concerns of Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
(Transat) merge to form CGM.
Trio Group 1973 Trio Group consortium formed of NYK, MOL, OCL and Ben Line.
Nedlloyd 1980 Nedlloyd group acquires KNSM-Kroonburgh.
USline 1982 US line buys Moore McCormack.
Crowley 1982 Crowley buys Delta.
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P&O 1986 P&O bought rest of the shares of O.C.L.
Global 1995 Global Alliance formed of APL, MOL, Nedlloyd & OOCL.
Grand 1995 Grand Alliance formed of P&O. NYK, NOL & Hapag-Lloyd.
Sealand-Maersk 1996 Sealand-Maersk Alliance formed.
- 1996 P&O-Nedlloyd merger.
- 1997 NOL's acquisition bid of APL.
- 1997 CMA-CGM merger.
- 1997 Hanjin- DSR senator merger.
Source: International Directory of Company Histories, Volume 5 and Volume 6
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